The Order of Things

Published to coincide with the 160th birthday of HG Wells (born 21 September 1866), the father of time travel stories.

I have been trying to write this story for many years, but its structure resisted me — for reasons that will, I hope, become clear.

CHAPTER 5: THE CROSSING

Dr Ashby appears where needed, not everywhere.

The corridor outside the experimental suite was lit only by the emergency strip along the floor. The main lights were off. The hum of the building felt louder than usual, as if the walls were listening.

Dr Ashby keyed in the override. The door slid open.

The core array was running at full power, its glow filling the room with a colour that didn’t belong to any known spectrum. Lena stood at the console, hands steady, eyes fixed on the readouts as if watching something only she could see.

“Lena,” Ashby said softly.

She didn’t turn, but spoke gently, “It’s ready.”

They stepped closer. The air was warm, metallic. Ozone clung to everything. “You should have waited.”

“I couldn’t. If I waited, I’d lose the nerve.”

The monitors told the truth: the sequence was already past the point where it could be safely aborted. The cascade had begun. The deck was already shuffling.

“You don’t have to do this,” Ashby said, and heard how thin it sounded even as they said it — the same thing they’d told a dozen students over the years, right before the ones who really meant it did it anyway.

She exhaled, a mixture of relief and resignation, “I do.”

The array brightened. The light folded in on itself, bending the air. It wasn’t white or blue or anything that belonged to the visible world. It was the colour of something that hadn’t been named yet.

Ashby reached toward the console.

“Don’t,” she finally looked at them, “You taught me to finish what I start.”

“I taught you a lot of things you shouldn’t have listened to.”

That almost got a laugh out of her — they saw it try to happen, saw her decide not to let it.

A tremor passed through the floor. Equipment racks rattled. Overhead fixtures flickered. The field was stabilising — or destabilising — they couldn’t tell. The numbers were meaningless now. Theory had reached the point where theory ended.

“Step back,” she pleaded.

They didn’t move. Twenty-six years they’d been doing this job, and they had never once managed to be the person who stopped a student from becoming a cautionary tale. They weren’t going to start tonight, either, whatever that said about them.

“Please.”

That word did it. Ashby stepped back.

Lena entered the field.

For a moment — a single, impossible moment — she was there and not there, her outline flickering like a reflection on disturbed water. The light wrapped around her. The air bent. Sound dropped away, replaced by a pressure felt in the bones more than the ears.

Then the light collapsed inward.

When Ashby’s vision cleared, the field was empty.

The monitors were blank. The hum of the building returned. The overhead lights steadied.

Ashby stood alone in the silence, already rehearsing what they’d tell the department in the morning, and already knowing none of it would be true.

CHAPTER 3: THE MENTOR

Lena noticed the cold the moment she stepped into Dr Ashby’s office — colder than the rest of the department, always. The shift in temperature, the faint hum of the old air-conditioning unit, the way the blinds were always half-closed even on bright days. It was a room designed for pragmatism, not comfort.

“Please sit,” Dr Ashby suggested, without looking up from the terminal.

Lena sat.

The silence stretched. Ashby finished typing, saved the file, and only then turned their attention fully to her. They had a way of looking at a student that made you feel like a dataset — not unkindly, just thoroughly.

“You’ve been running simulations outside your assigned hours.”

Lena kept her hands still in her lap. “Yes.”

“And you’ve been using equipment that isn’t allocated to your project.”

“Yes.”

“And you’ve been doing this without authorisation.”

She paused, “Yes.”

Dr Ashby leaned back in the chair. “Why?”

Lena opened her mouth, then closed it again. There was a true answer and there was an answer she could actually say out loud, and the gap between them felt enormous.

“Because I’m close.”

“Close to what?”

Lena swallowed, “A workable model.”

Ashby’s gaze sharpened. “A model of what?”

Lena didn’t answer.

Ashby stood, crossed to the whiteboard, and uncapped a marker. “Show me.”

Lena joined Dr Ashby. She drew the simplest version she could — the field geometry, the energy thresholds, the stabilisation curve. Not the whole thing. Not the part that mattered. Just enough to justify the hours she’d taken.

Dr Ashby watched her hand, not her face. That was the thing about Ashby — they always seemed to be reading the work instead of the person doing it, right up until the moment you realised they’d been reading both the whole time.

When she finished, they capped the marker and set it down with deliberate care.

“This is not a model,” Ashby noted, “This is an intention.”

Lena felt heat rise in her chest, “It’s more than that.”

“Not yet — ”

“It will be.”

Dr Ashby studied her for a long moment, then spoke softly, “You’re not sleeping.”

“I’m fine.”

“You’re not fine.” Their voice didn’t rise, “You’re cutting corners and isolating yourself. I’ve watched three students do exactly this before you, and I buried one of them, metaphorically speaking. I’d rather not make it literally.”

Lena looked away. “I don’t have time.”

“Time,” Ashby observed, “is not the problem you think it is.”

Lena’s breath caught — just for a moment — but Dr Ashby didn’t seem to notice… or at least, pretended not to.

They returned to the desk. On the corner, half-obscured by a manila folder, sat a small brown prescription bottle with a white label. Lena’s eye passed over it and moved on. Whatever it was, it wasn’t her business, and she was grateful — right then — not to have to make it her business.

Dr Ashby folded their hands. “You need to slow down and document things properly. You need to involve someone else in your process and this work. Perhaps most of all, you need to stop treating this department as if it exists to facilitate your private ambitions.”

Lena felt the words like a door closing.

“I’m not trying to cause trouble,” she protested quietly.

“I know,” Ashby replied, “But intention doesn’t change consequence.”

Lena stood, “I’ll be more careful.”

Ashby nodded once, “Good.”

Lena reached the door before Dr Ashby spoke again.

“Lena.”

She turned.

“Whatever you think you’re chasing,” Ashby suggested softly, “make sure it’s something you can live with.”

Lena didn’t answer. She stepped into the corridor, letting the cold air of the office fall away behind her.

Dr Ashby sat back down at the terminal, and did not immediately start typing.

CHAPTER 6: ARRIVAL

The first thing Lena noticed was the light.

Not brightness — quality. It was softer here, diffused, as if the air itself held memory. She stood very still, waiting for the dizziness to pass. The floor beneath her feet was solid.

Nothing in the room suggested a time.

The room was familiar in the way a dream is familiar: shapes she recognised, distances she didn’t.

All around her was a solid world: a desk, a window,the faint hum of an old ventilation unit. The smell of coffee — not burnt, not factory formula, but the good kind, the kind that lived in a bottom drawer.

Someone was standing with their back to her.

Lena knew the outline before she knew the name. The tilt of the head. The way the shoulders moved when they breathed. The small, unconscious gesture of pushing a sleeve up the forearm.

Roman — utterly, obliviously alive.

Lena didn’t move. She didn’t speak. If this was a memory, or a vision, or the last flicker of a mind coming apart, she didn’t want to be the one who found out by breaking it.

Roman reached for a mug on the counter — the chipped one, the one Lena had told them a hundred times to throw out, and the one they’d kept out of what Lena had always suspected was pure stubbornness rather than sentiment. Roman lifted it, inhaled the steam, and made a small face at the first sip, the way they always did, every single time, as though hot coffee were a personal betrayal they kept forgiving.

Lena had forgotten that. The face. Somewhere in the months since, she’d kept the big things — the voice, the arguments, the whiteboard — and let the small stupid ones slip. It was the small one that undid her now.

Roman turned slightly, just enough that Lena could see the line of their jaw, the familiar concentration as they read something on the counter. Probably the same three words they always reread when they were stalling before starting work. Roman was, Lena thought, constitutionally incapable of just getting on with things.

She didn’t speak the name. She didn’t need to.

The moment echoed: Roman a few feet away and a lifetime away, both at once, doing something as unremarkable as drinking bad coffee badly, entirely unaware that anyone was watching, or that anyone ever would be again.

And then the light shifted, as if the world were inhaling.

Everything waited.

CHAPTER 4: THE ARGUMENT

Lena found Dr Ashby in the lab long after midnight, standing at the central bench with a stack of printouts spread like a fan. The overhead lights were off; only the desk lamp was on, casting a narrow circle of clarity in a room full of shadows.

“You’ve been running it,” Dr Ashby observed, without turning, “The full sequence.”

Lena closed the door behind her, “Yes.”

Dr Ashby lifted one of the pages. The numbers were unmistakable — the energy curve, the stabilisation window, the threshold Lena had sworn she wouldn’t cross without supervision.

“You promised me,” Dr Ashby protested firmly.

“I know.”

“You said you would wait.”

“I know.”

Dr Ashby set the page down, “Then why didn’t you?”

Lena stepped forward, “Because waiting won’t change anything.”

“It will change everything,” Dr Ashby answered sharply, “It will give you time to think… to test and verify. And to make sure you’re not about to destroy yourself.”

Lena’s jaw tightened, “I’m not destroying anything.”

“You don’t know that.”

“I do.”

Dr Ashby turned then — fully, completely — and Lena felt the force of their attention like a physical pressure.

“You’re grieving,” Dr Ashby sighed softly, “and grief makes people reckless.”

“This isn’t about grief…”

“It’s entirely about grief. I’ve read your notes, Lena. Every equation on that whiteboard has Roman’s handwriting underneath it. You’re not chasing a breakthrough. You’re chasing a conversation you didn’t get to finish.”

Lena flinched — the first honest reaction she’d given all night, “That’s not fair!”

“It’s not meant to be fair, it’s meant to be true.”

The room felt smaller. The hum of the equipment seemed louder. Lena could feel the pulse in her throat.

“I can’t stop,” she exclaimed,. “I’m too close.”

“Close to what?” Dr Ashby demanded, “A breakthrough? A collapse?”

Lena didn’t answer.

Dr Ashby stepped closer. “Lena, listen to me. You are brilliant and capable. But you are not invincible. And this—” They gestured to the printouts, “This is not a controlled experiment. This is a gamble.”

“It’s not a gamble,” Lena responded quietly, “It’s the only chance I have.”

Dr Ashby froze. Something crossed their face — quick, unguarded, gone before Lena could name it. It looked almost like envy, which made no sense, and which Lena decided she must have imagined.

“You’re talking like someone who has already decided,” they suggested.

“I have.”

Dr Ashby exhaled slowly, “Then there’s nothing I can say.”

Lena stepped back. “I didn’t come here for permission.”

“I know.”

“I came to tell you because—” She stopped. The words were too heavy to lift.

Dr Ashby waited.

“Because you deserved to know,” Lena finished.

A long silence settled between them — the kind that isn’t really about waiting for the other person to speak, but about neither of them being ready for the conversation to be over.

Dr Ashby nodded once. “If you’re going to do this, at least do it cleanly. Document everything. Run the diagnostics twice. And don’t pretend you’re ready when you’re not.”

Lena swallowed, “Thank you.”

Dr Ashby looked at her — really looked — and for a moment seemed to be deciding whether thirty years of caution had ever actually stopped anyone from doing anything, or whether it had only ever made the leaving harder to watch.

They didn’t say so.

“Go,” Dr Ashby instructed, “Before I change my mind.”

Lena turned and left the lab.

Dr Ashby stood alone in the circle of lamplight, the printouts still fanned across the bench like a hand of cards no one had wanted to deal.

CHAPTER 2: BEFORE

The experiment that eventually changed everything began, as most things do, with an argument about coffee.

Roman had strong opinions. The coffee in the department common room was, in Roman’s view, a form of institutional violence — thin, burnt at the edges, served in cups that retained heat with the enthusiasm of wet paper. Lena had learned to drink it anyway. Roman never did, and never let her forget that she did.

So they worked late, the two of them, with a French press Roman kept in the bottom drawer of the filing cabinet and a bag of Ethiopian single-origin that cost more than either of them could reasonably justify on a postgraduate stipend. This was their ritual. Papers spread across the bench. The hiss of the kettle. Roman reading upside-down over Lena’s shoulder without being asked, correcting her arithmetic in a tone that suggested this was a great personal sacrifice on their part.

“That’s not right,” Roman would say, tapping the page. They were never wrong about this, which Lena found less endearing in the moment than she did later.

They had been working on the temporal displacement model for seven months by then — seven months of equations that looped back on themselves, of diagrams that looked like something between a circuit board and a nervous breakdown. The university didn’t fund it. The department didn’t know it existed. It lived in the margins of other projects, scrawled in notebooks, taking up space that officially belonged to something more respectable.

“Nobody has to know yet,” Roman had observed, in the beginning, with the particular confidence of someone who had never once in their life asked permission for anything they actually wanted to do.

“We’ll know,” Lena replied, “That’s enough.”

She had believed this. She still did, mostly, though “mostly” was doing more work in that concept than she liked to admit.

The night she thought about later — the one she turned over and over in her mind repeatedly — was a Tuesday in November. She remembered the rain, and Roman standing at the whiteboard with a marker, drawing the diagram that would eventually become central to everything: a deck of cards, fanned out, then gathered, then shuffled.

“Time isn’t a river,” Roman theorised, “Everyone thinks it’s a river because that’s how we experience it. One thing, then the next thing, then the next. But that’s just the order we’re dealt the cards. The cards exist all at once. The sequence is an illusion.”

“That’s not a new idea,” Lena replied.

“No.” Roman turned from the board, and there it was — that look Lena had learned to recognise and, later, to miss more than almost anything else about them: complete, unguarded attention, the kind Roman only gave to ideas they hadn’t yet decided were safe to believe in. “But it’s a solvable one.”

Lena had known, in that moment, that they were going to build it. Whatever it took.

What she hadn’t known — what she was careful, even now, not to let herself think about for too long — was what it would end up costing to find out.

“Lena.”

Just her name. Said the way Roman said things that mattered — quietly, without preamble, as though the important things didn’t need volume, only your attention. She looked up from the page.

“We’ll need more coffee.”

She went to put the kettle on. It was, she would think much later, the last completely ordinary thing either of them ever asked of her.

CHAPTER 1: THE DECK

Lena switched on the recorder because writing felt too slow. The lab was empty at this hour, the building quiet in the way only universities become quiet — a silence made of concrete, old wiring, and the faint echo of other people’s work.

“This is a note for the record,” she announced, “Not for publication. Just for accuracy.”

She paused, listening to the soft click of the machine, and found herself irritated at how steady her own voice sounded. She’d expected it to shake.

“People talk about time as if it moves. As if it flows. As if it carries us with it. But that’s just a metaphor we inherited from rivers, and rivers are only one way of thinking about sequence.”

She reached for the deck of cards on the bench: a cheap pack from the campus bookstore, the kind with a glossy finish and a faint chemical smell, the kind Roman would have complained about for a full minute before admitting it was fine, actually, and using it anyway. She fanned the cards out on the metal surface.

“Here,” she thought aloud, “This is time.”

She tapped the cards lightly with her fingertips.

“All the moments exist. All at once. The order we experience them in is just the order we’re dealt. One card, then the next, then the next. Chronology is not a property of time; it’s a property of perception.”

She gathered the cards into a neat stack, and it occurred to her, not for the first time, that she was explaining this as much to herself as to whoever might eventually be listening.

“If you deal them in order, you get a life that makes sense. Cause, effect. Before, after. A story with a beginning and an end.”

She shuffled the deck once — a clean, practiced motion, the kind of thing your hands remember even when the rest of you is exhausted.

“But if you shuffle them, the story changes. The same cards. The same events. Just… rearranged.”

She set the deck down.

“The experiment isn’t about travelling through time. That’s the wrong verb. It’s about changing the order of the cards. Changing the sequence in which a life is dealt.”

She paused. The hum of the equipment filled the space, and for a moment Lena let herself think about how strange it was to be doing something this large in a room this small and ordinary — the same bench she’d spilled coffee on a dozen times, the same flickering fluorescent tube nobody had ever bothered to replace.

“If this works, someone reading this later will have already seen the results. They’ll have seen the cards out of order. They’ll have seen the consequences before the causes. They’ll have watched the ending before the beginning.”

She exhaled slowly, and let herself, just for a second, imagine who that someone might be, before deciding it was better not to.

“And if they’ve reached this point — this chapter — then they’ll understand what to do next.”

She closed the deck, squared the edges, and placed it beside the recorder.

“Start again,” she declared, “This time in order.”

She switched off the machine, and sat for a while longer in the dark before she let herself leave.

©2026 Geoff Allshorn. I show my respect for Elders past and present and acknowledge the Wurundjeri-Willam people, the Traditional Custodians of the Land on which this blog was prepared. Editorial assistance from Claude AI.

Democracy Error 404: World Not Found

Noting International Day of Democracy — Tuesday, 15 September 2026

Image by George Dronov from Pixabay

Something is unsettling the democratic world, and it isn’t a coup. Instead there’s a slower, stranger phenomenon: millions of people, voting freely and correctly by every procedural measure, for outcomes that dismantle the norms and institutions upon which democracy depends. Brexit. MAGA. The rise of illiberal governments in Hungary, Poland, Italy, Argentina, and beyond. Dog whistling politicians in Australia. Distrust of vaccines and medical experts, science and scientists, the UN, the EU, NATO, and the very idea of expertise. Disregard for human rights except when used to support presumed individual privilege. A movement away from the collective, towards the individual.

So… is democracy dying? Not exactly. It might be worse than that: democracy may be working exactly as designed, while delivering results that erode the conditions it needs to survive.

What the data actually shows

Political scientists have a term for this: democratic backsliding — the gradual, often lawful weakening of checks on executive power, judicial independence, and press freedom by leaders who were themselves elected. According to the V-Dem Institute’s 2026 Democracy Report, nearly a quarter of the world’s countries were undergoing autocratization in 2025 — including several in Europe and North America, with growing pressure on media and journalists worldwide.

Crucially, this isn’t confined to fragile or new democracies. Harvard political scientists Steven Levitsky and Daniel Ziblatt, in their influential book How Democracies Die, argue that modern democracies rarely collapse in a single dramatic moment; instead, critical institutions like the judiciary and the press are worn down slowly, and long-standing political norms erode gradually — often at the hands of leaders who came to power through entirely legitimate elections.

Trust itself is also collapsing, and not just in governments. The 2026 Edelman Trust Barometer — a survey of nearly 34,000 people across 28 countries — found that seven in ten respondents are now unwilling or hesitant to trust someone with different values, backgrounds, or sources of information, a pattern the report calls “insularity,” cutting across income, gender, age, and nation. Edelman’s own framing is stark: trust has stopped being something people extend toward the common good, and started retreating into smaller, more homogeneous circles.

Strengthening the backlash

It would be intellectually lazy — and simply wrong — to treat every Brexit or MAGA voter as a passive dupe or a bad actor. There is real, well-documented material behind the backlash.

Political scientists Ronald Inglehart and Pippa Norris, in their widely cited analysis of populism’s rise, tested two competing theories: that populism is driven by economic insecurity among the “left behind,” or by a cultural backlash against rapid social change. Their research found the most consistent evidence for the cultural backlash thesis — but economic grievance is far from irrelevant. Harvard’s Weatherhead Center notes that political elites have channelled genuine public grievances — anxiety about the Great Recession, terrorism, and mass migration — into ethnoracial resentment and distrust of political institutions, resonating with voters who feel dishonest politicians and distant institutions have failed them.

This matters for how the essay should be read: the people voting for Brexit or for populist strongmen are not, in the main, uniquely narcissistic individuals. Many are responding — rationally, if not always accurately — to decades of deindustrialisation, stagnant wages, and institutions that talked past them rather than to them. Any honest account of “the death of democracy” has to hold that truth alongside the concern about where the backlash has been steered.

Putting the ‘Cult’ in Culture

A further shift beneath democratic backsliding is the way fractured information worlds begin to behave like cults. Not cults in the religious sense, but in the sociological one: closed belief systems, charismatic micro‑authorities, and rigid boundaries between insiders and outsiders. Research across political science, media studies, and sociology shows this pattern emerging when societies lose a shared factual world (Levitsky & Ziblatt, How Democracies Die, 2018; V‑Dem Democracy Report 2026; Edelman Trust Barometer 2026; Sunstein, #Republic, 2017).

Political scientists describe this as a breakdown in common reality. Media scholars show how algorithmic sorting creates insulated information loops. Sociologists studying cultic behaviour note that closed informational systems produce predictable dynamics: identity fused with belief, distrust of external authority, and moralised narratives that frame disagreement as betrayal (Elias–Lasch debate; ResearchGate 2013).

Across countries and political orientations, the same features recur. Information from outside the group is dismissed as biased or corrupt, while internal sources are treated as inherently trustworthy — a pattern reflected in Edelman’s 2026 finding that seven in ten respondents are unwilling to trust anyone with different values or information sources. Beliefs become markers of belonging, and changing one’s mind risks social exclusion rather than intellectual revision. Influencers, niche commentators, and partisan media gain more authority than institutions with formal expertise, a dynamic documented in studies of populist mobilisation (Inglehart & Norris, 2016). Political issues are reframed as purity contests or existential threats, and norm erosion accelerates when opponents are cast as enemies rather than competitors (Levitsky & Ziblatt). Criticism from outside is interpreted as validation — “If they attack us, it proves we’re right” — a pattern widely observed in research on conspiratorial movements (Weatherhead Center, 2016). Conformity is enforced through shaming, ostracism, or withdrawal of trust.

These dynamics matter because they block the basic mechanisms democracy relies on: persuasion, correction, and shared evidence. When information worlds become self‑sealing, citizens no longer revise beliefs in response to new facts. Institutions lose legitimacy not because they fail, but because they sit outside the group’s informational boundary. Elections still occur, but they no longer arbitrate between competing visions of the future; they arbitrate between incompatible realities.

This is the “cult in culture” problem: informational tribes that cannot be left without losing identity, community, and moral certainty. Once enough citizens inhabit these sealed worlds, democracy continues procedurally while losing the shared factual ground it needs to survive.

When “My Rights” Replaces “Our Rights”

Where something does seem to have shifted is in the language of rights itself — from a shared claim (“our rights,” exercised collectively, in solidarity with others) toward an individual one (“my rights,” asserted against the collective, including against public health measures, environmental limits, or the authority of experts).

The American historian Christopher Lasch anticipated a version of this decades ago in The Culture of Narcissism (1979), arguing that economic change — rising prosperity alongside a scarcity of meaningful work — had devalued the wisdom of experience and brought all forms of authority into disrepute, producing a self-absorbed character type more interested in personal validation than collective purpose. It’s worth being honest that Lasch’s thesis has always been contested: critics have called it an empirically unproven, conservative reaction to the social liberalisation of the 1960s and 70s rather than a rigorously demonstrated cultural shift. Lasch himself insisted narcissism wasn’t simply a synonym for selfishness, and blamed both the progressive left (for undermining family structures) and the market right (for dissolving traditional communities) — it was never a partisan diagnosis in his own telling, however it’s since been used.

Whether or not “narcissism” is the precise clinical term for it, something like this dynamic is visible in the data: the same Edelman survey found people increasingly unwilling to trust anyone outside their own circle, and institutions increasingly judged not by whether they serve the common good, but by whether they serve me.

The moment we are living through also exposes the old argument about isms: capitalism versus communism, collectivism versus individualism, authoritarianism versus narcissism. These debates have always been framed as contests between competing ideologies, each claiming to organise society more justly or efficiently than the others. But the present disruption suggests a different reading: the problem is not which ism wins, but what happens when any system — economic, political, or cultural — loses the shared factual world it depends on. Once that common world fractures, the isms stop being frameworks for organising society and start becoming identities people defend, perform, and weaponise. And that is the point at which democracy begins to undo itself.

What can actually be done

This is the harder question, and the honest answer is: nothing fast, and nothing purely rhetorical. But the research does point somewhere.

Cross-partisan coalitions, not culture war. Levitsky and Ziblatt argue that pro-democratic forces need to transcend the partisan divide, building broad coalitions across racial, ethnic, religious, and socioeconomic lines rather than treating democracy’s defence as one side’s project against the other’s. A coalition that only ever recruits from the already-convinced doesn’t reach the people whose trust has been lost.

Take the economic grievance seriously, not just the cultural one. Ziblatt and Levitsky’s reviewers note that economic and social reforms aimed at a more equitable distribution of wealth tend to reduce the polarization that feeds democratic decay. If status anxiety and economic precarity are real drivers of backlash politics, addressing the material grievance is not a concession — it’s part of the fix.

Rebuild trust deliberately, at the local and relational level. Edelman’s own recommendation, drawn directly from the 2026 data, is what they call “trust brokering” — recognising that trust is now rebuilt through relationships (employers, doctors, local voices) rather than declared by distant institutions, and that leaders who consult people with different values and engage constructively with critics can widen circles of trust rather than assuming those circles will widen themselves.

Defend the institutions without pretending they’re beyond criticism. The UN, the EU, NATO, and national governments are not sacred; they are flawed human structures that have, in real instances, failed the people now rejecting them. Defending democratic norms convincingly means acknowledging those failures honestly, not dismissing distrust as ignorance.

A humanist closing thought

None of this fixes itself, and none of it happens quickly. But there is something genuinely humanist in refusing both despair and easy blame — in holding, at once, that democratic backsliding is real and dangerous, that the backlash driving it often has legitimate roots, and that the antidote isn’t nostalgia for institutions as they were, but the same expanding circle of concern humanism has always argued for: one wide enough to take in the people who feel it has left them out.

—

Bibliography

“Democratic Backsliding.” Wikipedia, citing V-Dem Institute Democracy Report 2026.

Levitsky, Steven, and Daniel Ziblatt, How Democracies Die. New York: Crown, 2018.

“How Democracies Die.” Penguin Random House.

“A Discussion of Steven Levitsky and Daniel Ziblatt’s How Democracies Die.” University of Washington Department of Political Science.

“How Democracies Die: What History Reveals About Our Future.” Consilium (Council of the EU library blog).

“2026 Edelman Trust Barometer Reveals Trust Is In Peril As Society Slides from Grievance into Insularity.” Edelman, January 18, 2026.

“2026 Edelman Trust Barometer on How to Build Trust in Organizations.” Interfaith America, March 25, 2026.

Inglehart, Ronald F., and Pippa Norris. “Trump, Brexit, and the Rise of Populism: Economic Have-Nots and Cultural Backlash.” Harvard Kennedy School Working Paper RWP16-026, 2016.

“Background to Brexit: Populism, Nationalism, and the Politics of Resentment.” Harvard Weatherhead Center Epicenter, 2016.

“The Culture of Narcissism Summary.” SuperSummary.

“Narcissism or Informalization?: Christopher Lasch, Norbert Elias and Social Diagnosis.” ResearchGate.

Lasch, Christopher. The Culture of Narcissism: American Life in an Age of Diminishing Expectations, New York: W. W. Norton, 1979.

Bibliography — New Sources for “Putting the Cult in Culture”

Sunstein, Cass R. “Echo Chambers.” University of Chicago Public Law Working Paper, 2001.

Sunstein, Cass R. #Republic: Divided Democracy in the Age of Social Media. Princeton University Press, 2017.

Pariser, Eli. The Filter Bubble: What the Internet Is Hiding from You. Penguin, 2011.

Tufekci, Zeynep. “Engineering the Public: Big Data, Surveillance and Computational Politics.” First Monday, 2014.

Mozilla Foundation. “YouTube Regrets: How the Algorithm Drives Extremism.” 2021.

Vosoughi, Soroush, Roy, Deb, and Aral, Sinan. “The Spread of True and False News Online.” Science, 2018.

Trust Collapse and Insularity

Edelman. “2026 Edelman Trust Barometer: Society Slides into Insularity.”

Pew Research Center. “Political Polarization in the American Public.” 2014.

Pew Research Center. “Americans’ Trust in Government: 2022.”

Cult Dynamics, Identity Fusion, Group Psychology

Hogg, Michael A. “Uncertainty–Identity Theory.” Advances in Experimental Social Psychology, 2007.

Langone, Michael. “Cults: Questions and Answers.” International Cultic Studies Association.

Singer, Margaret Thaler. Cults in Our Midst. Jossey-Bass, 2003.

Hassan, Steven. Combating Cult Mind Control. Freedom of Mind Press, 2015.

Populism, Identity, and Closed Belief Systems

Inglehart, Ronald F., and Pippa Norris. “Trump, Brexit, and the Rise of Populism: Economic Have-Nots and Cultural Backlash.” Harvard Kennedy School Working Paper RWP16-026, 2016.

Gidron, Noam, and Hall, Peter A. “Populism as a Problem of Social Integration.” Comparative Political Studies, 2020.

Mudde, Cas. The Far Right Today. Polity Press, 2019.


©2026 Geoff Allshorn. I acknowledge the Wurundjeri-Willam people, the Traditional Custodians of the land on which this blog was prepared, and show my respect for Elders past and present. Research assistance supplied by AI.

A September 11 Every Day

Twenty-five years after an atrocity, and the pattern it revealed.
Published today, not yesterday — out of respect for those still grieving.

Image by Myriams-Fotos from Pixabay

Twenty-five years ago, nearly three thousand people went to work, boarded planes, or answered emergency calls, and did not come home. Anyone who remembers that day remembers where they were when they saw the towers fall. The shock was immediate, universal, and genuinely shared across the world. It was, and remains, one of the great atrocities in living memory.

I want to honour that grief before I move beyond it. What follows is not an attempt to diminish the loss of September 11, nor to relativise it out of existence with a spreadsheet. I want to propose the opposite: presenting an argument that the scale of feeling we attached to that day — the shock, the collective mourning, the sense that this absolutely mattered — is a measure we should be willing to apply consistently, not only when the dead are American and the cameras are rolling.

This is not a claim that grief is a competition, nor that any death matters more or less depending on where it happens, who commits it, or whether a government finds it convenient to notice. They are the same category of thing: a human life, ended, that someone loved and now grieves. The humanist premise beneath everything that follows is simple, and I think uncontroversial once it is actually said aloud: human suffering does not become more or less real depending on the day, the location, or who was watching.

Because if you are willing to look, the last eighty years supply case after case where a similar scale of death has occurred, sometimes as direct consequence of decisions made in Washington, and been met with silence rather than a international day of mourning. This is an essay about that pattern, and about what a superpower that once organised itself around expanding freedom ultimately did, over and over, when freedom proved to be inconvenient.

An Empire Built on Genuinely Good Ideas

It is worth being honest about the starting point, because a critique that pretends the United States has been nothing but harmful is not a serious critique; it’s a cartoon, and cartoons are easy to dismiss.

The postwar settlement the US built after 1945 was, in real ways, extraordinary. The United Nations, whatever its later dysfunctions, was a genuine attempt to make war illegal and put human rights on a universal footing. The Marshall Plan rebuilt a continent instead of looting it, an almost unprecedented act of victor’s restraint. Bretton Woods gave the postwar world a functioning international monetary order. For decades, the US underwrote the idea — imperfectly, unevenly, but sincerely — that trade, alliance and law were better instruments of power than raw conquest. Whatever the flaws in delivery, USAID and its predecessor programs went on to save an extraordinary number of lives; a 2025 peer-reviewed study in The Lancet estimated that USAID funding alone prevented roughly 90 million deaths in developing countries between 2001 and 2021.

That’s a noble history worthy of acknowledgement. The trouble is what ran alongside it, almost from the beginning.

The Template: 1953–1954

Barely eight years after founding the UN on the principle of self-determination, the US helped depose two elected governments for asserting exactly that principle over their own resources.

In 1953, a CIA-orchestrated coup removed Iran’s democratically elected prime minister, Mohammad Mossadegh, whose crime was nationalising his own country’s oil industry. The Shah was restored to the throne with US backing, and ruled with an increasingly repressive security apparatus for the next twenty-five years, until the 1979 revolution which many historians trace (at least in part) back to the resentments seeded in 1953.

A year later, in Guatemala, a CIA-backed coup toppled Jacobo Árbenz, whose land reforms had threatened the interests of the US-owned United Fruit Company. What followed was decades of military dictatorship and a civil war that killed an estimated 200,000 people, most of them Indigenous Maya.

Neither of these countries had attacked the United States. Neither posed it any military threat. Both had simply asserted control over their own economic destiny, in ways that inconvenienced US commercial and strategic interests — and in both cases, democracy was the casualty.

This is the template: intervention justified in the language of freedom and security, delivered in practice as regime change on behalf of narrower interests, with the resulting instability blamed later on the region itself rather than on the intervention that produced it.

The Cold War Pattern

For the next four decades, that template repeated with grim regularity, usually under the banner of anti-communism.

Vietnam: cost an estimated two million Vietnamese civilian lives, alongside more than a million Vietnamese and Cambodian combatants, some 58,000 US service members, and roughly 200,000 Laotians killed during the CIA’s covert “Secret War” bombing campaign — a toll that dwarfs the 9/11 death count many times over, in a war whose strategic rationale (the “domino theory”) has been largely abandoned by historians.

Chile, 1973: A CIA-backed coup removed Salvador Allende, South America’s first democratically elected socialist president, and installed Augusto Pinochet, whose secret police killed or “disappeared” more than three thousand people and tortured tens of thousands more over the following seventeen years.

Indonesia, 1965–66: US intelligence agencies provided support — including, by some accounts, lists of suspected communists — to the Suharto regime during a massacre that killed between 500,000 and a million people, one of the twentieth century’s least-remembered atrocities precisely because the victims were on the “right” side of the Cold War ledger from Washington’s perspective.

Central America in the 1980s: El Salvador, Nicaragua, Guatemala again — saw the US fund and train military and paramilitary forces responsible for mass killings of civilians, from the El Mozote massacre to the broader Guatemalan genocide against Maya communities, a campaign a UN-backed truth commission later concluded amounted to genocide.

In every one of these cases, the stated rationale was the defence of freedom. In every one, freedom was the first thing sacrificed.

The 1991 Gulf War was fought under clear UN mandate to reverse an actual invasion — but even this least-contested case had its own atrocity: retreating Iraqi forces fleeing Kuwait were bombed for hours on Highway 80, a stretch later known as the “Highway of Death,” killing several hundred to well over a thousand people and destroying up to 2,700 vehicles — an assault on a defeated, retreating force still debated as a possible violation of the Geneva Conventions. Somalia in 1993 showed the limits of humanitarian intervention without a coherent exit strategy. Throughout the 1990s, the US positioned itself as the world’s indispensable power without ever quite settling what, beyond its own primacy, that power was for.

How Many Interventions?

Before moving into the twenty-first century, it’s worth pausing on the scale of what’s been described so far, because the honest answer to “how many” is: it depends on who’s counting and what counts as an “intervention” — and pretending otherwise would undermine the rest of the argument. A few credible counts, each with its own methodology:

– The US Congressional Research Service — a US government body, not an outside critic — has documented at least 469 military interventions since 1798, with roughly 251 of those occurring between 1991 and 2022 alone. This is the broadest definition, including shows of force and evacuations alongside invasions.
– An academic dataset compiled by political scientists Sidita Kushi and Monica Duffy Toft counts 392–393 US military interventions since 1776, more than half of them since 1945 — and notes that 1974 was the last year the US did not launch at least one new intervention.
– The research database usprimacy.org, using a more restrictive definition that separates out sanctions and regime support as distinct categories, counts 83 direct military interventions since 1945 across 41 countries.
– Historian William Blum’s postwar survey counted more than 70 nations subject to serious US intervention during the Cold War period alone.
– The IBON Foundation puts the broader figure at 96 countries invaded or intervened in since 1945, combining direct and indirect action.

The range — from roughly 80 to over 250 — isn’t evidence of dishonesty on anyone’s part. It reflects a genuine definitional question: does arming a proxy count the same as an invasion? Does a coup carried out by local actors with CIA support count the same as a bombing campaign? Whichever end of that range you find most persuasive, even the most conservative, government-sourced count places the US in double digits per year across eight decades — a tempo of intervention no other nation on Earth has sustained.

September 11 as a Case Study

This is where this terrible anniversary earns its place in the historical record: not as the beginning of something new and peculiar, but as the clearest possible illustration of a pattern that was already eighty years old.

The attacks of September 11, 2001 were an atrocity by any definition: the deliberate murder of civilians, coordinated and premeditated, carried out by non-state actors with no legitimate claim to the violence they inflicted. Nothing in this article should be read as excusing that.

Explaining an atrocity is not the same as justifying it, and that distinction is doing real work in the next few sentences, so it is worth stating twice: nothing here transfers any culpability away from the people who planned and carried out the murder of nearly three thousand people. With that said as plainly as it can be said, it is a documented historical fact, not a theory, that Osama bin Laden claimed a specific point of origin for the idea. In a videotaped statement broadcast in October 2004 — released, it should be said, as wartime propaganda timed four days before a US presidential election, which limits how much weight any single line of it should carry — he stated that the idea of destroying towers in the USA first occurred to him while watching towers destroyed in Beirut during Israel’s 1982 invasion of Lebanon, an invasion the US backed with its own naval forces. This essay is not built on that claim, and does not need it to make its argument; the eighty years of documented US and allied intervention described elsewhere here stand on their own evidence. But it is worth naming as one data point among many: even from the perpetrator’s own mouth, the resentment that produced the worst atrocity in this pattern’s history did not arise from nothing.

But the US response did not emerge from a moral or strategic blank slate. It emerged from the same institutional reflexes that had produced Guatemala and Chile and Indonesia, this time deployed at far greater scale, and this time in full public view.

The invasion of Iraq in 2003 reused the same regime-change logic that had toppled Mossadegh in 1953, this time dressed up as counter-terrorism — despite Iraq having no connection to the September 11 attacks and no weapons of mass destruction, a fact confirmed by the postwar inspections. The Iraq War and its aftermath are estimated to have caused somewhere between 275,000 and half a million deaths; the low estimate alone is roughly a hundred times the toll of the 9/11 attack.

Guantanamo Bay held people without trial for years, some for over a decade, under conditions that violated the same human-rights norms the US had spent fifty years telling the rest of the world to uphold. The CIA’s rendition and “enhanced interrogation” programs (torture, under its plain meaning) were later confirmed by the US Senate’s own investigation. The drone campaigns that followed in Pakistan, Yemen, Somalia and elsewhere killed thousands of people outside any battlefield or declared war, including a documented pattern of civilian casualties that rarely made front pages in the country doing the killing.

None of this was an aberration from US history; it is part of its ongoing story.

The Pattern Continues

Libya in 2011 showed the same instinct: intervention with no plan for what came after, leaving a state that has not fully recovered. Mass surveillance programs, revealed in 2013, extended the security logic of the War on Terror onto the US’s own citizens and allies alike. And now a newer instrument has entered the same toolkit: the withdrawal of aid as a form of policy, rather than its provision.

This is where the anniversary and the present moment meet directly. The same 2025 Lancet study that credited USAID with saving 90 million lives over two decades also modelled what happens when that funding is withdrawn. Its projection: more than 14 million additional deaths by 2030, a third of them children under five — over 700,000 child deaths a year, from diseases and malnutrition that development aid had been quietly preventing. A follow-up study in 2026 from the Barcelona Institute for Global Health, using more conservative assumptions, still projected 9.4 million deaths by 2030, rising to 22.6 million if the cuts deepen further. Independent trackers have already documented hundreds of thousands of deaths in the period since the cuts began — children who died of measles, malaria and diarrhoeal disease that a functioning clinic, a week earlier, would have treated.

Spread across the years to 2030, the 14-million projection works out to somewhere over seven thousand deaths a day — more than double the toll of September 11, every single day, for years, largely unmarked by memorial or headline.

I want to be careful here, because precision matters and false precision is its own kind of dishonesty. These are modelled projections, not a body count — built from decades of data on what aid funding demonstrably prevented, then run forward under the assumption that removing the funding removes the protection. Reasonable people can and do argue about the model’s assumptions. But even the most conservative published estimate — child deaths alone, at roughly 1,900 a day — sits close to the September 11 toll, repeating not once, but daily, indefinitely, for as long as the funding stays cut.

The Pattern Today

None of this is safely confined to history. In the year leading up to this anniversary alone, the same reflexes have been on full public display, across multiple continents at once:

Venezuela: Beginning in September 2025, the US conducted dozens of strikes on boats in Caribbean and Pacific waters it accused of drug trafficking — more than 35 strikes killing at least 115 people before the campaign escalated further. In January 2026, a US military raid captured President Nicolás Maduro and forcibly removed him to face trial in New York. The UN’s human rights chief called for an investigation into the strikes, describing them as extrajudicial killings; legal analysts have concluded the strikes were unlawful under both domestic and international law. Some of those killed were reportedly headed away from the US, not toward it, when they were hit.

Iran: In February 2026, US and Israeli strikes on Iran included one that hit a girls’ elementary school in Minab, killing well over a hundred students — the deadliest single US-linked strike on civilians in recent memory. Months later, human rights organisations were still reporting that no accountability had been provided to the victims’ families, amid what Amnesty International described as stonewalling from the Pentagon.

Iraq: The same 2026 conflict spilled into Iraq, where US and allied strikes on Iran-backed militias killed dozens of fighters and a number of Iraqi civilians and soldiers, including a senior Iraqi military commander — a reminder that “precision” campaigns routinely kill people who are neither the intended target nor combatants.

Yemen: A Pentagon review admitted that US strikes against Houthi rebels killed at least 153 civilians in 2025, including a strike on a fuel port that killed 80 people in a single night, an attack Human Rights Watch said should be investigated as a war crime.

Sudan: Not a direct US intervention, but a case study in what withdrawal costs: as famine spread across Darfur and the death toll from the civil war climbed past 150,000 by some estimates, the same US aid cuts that inform the projections above hit a country the US State Department had already determined was experiencing genocide — a determination followed, for the most part, by silence rather than sustained action.

Gaza: Here the record is genuinely mixed, and worth stating plainly: US diplomatic pressure helped broker a ceasefire in October 2025 that stopped the worst of an active war. But nine months on, most of the peace plan’s substantive commitments — full humanitarian access, Israeli withdrawal, a genuine path to Palestinian self-determination — remain unfulfilled, and hundreds of Palestinians have been killed by continued strikes during the supposed truce. That ceasefire, moreover, came only after the US had vetoed at least six separate UN Security Council resolutions calling for a Gaza ceasefire between February 2024 and September 2025, on each occasion the sole vote against, opposing 13 or 14 other Council members including close allies. The same period saw the US approve tens of billions of dollars in new arms sales to Israel, including a $20 billion package in 2024 and roughly $12 billion more in the first weeks of the current administration; continued material support running in parallel with, not despite, the diplomatic isolation.

Mexico, Canada, and Greenland: And alongside actual strikes, 2025 and 2026 produced open threats of force against three of the US’s own neighbours and allies: repeated refusals to rule out military action to seize Greenland from Denmark, talk of annexing Canada as a “51st state,” and a President publicly announcing plans to conduct “land” strikes inside Mexican territory against cartels — each threat met with the target nation’s own leaders publicly reasserting a sovereignty that, eighty years after World War 2, should not need reasserting to the country that helped write the UN Charter.

Individually, any one of these might be argued away as an isolated decision, a hard case, a war fought against a genuine bad actor. Together, in a single twelve-month window, they are not an aberration. They are the pattern this essay has traced since 1953, simply running at its normal speed, in real time, while the anniversary was being observed.

What the Multiplication Means

If you lost someone on September 11, I am not asking you to feel that grief any less. As a fellow human being with empathy and decency, I respectfully stand with you in feeling your loss and sharing your sense of injustice. However, I also ask you to imagine it happening to someone else, today, in a clinic in Malawi or a refugee settlement in Kenya, to a parent who will get no memorial service, no name on a wall, no US President visiting to lay a wreath, and no TV programs 25 years later to revisit the tragedy.

The child who dies of malaria because of cuts to a USAID-funded program did not choose that risk any more than did an office worker who went to the World Trade Center that Tuesday morning. Neither death is more or less real. Neither person is more or less important than the other. The difference is not in the weight of the loss; it’s in whether the world is willing to look.

Someone might reasonably object here: surely there’s a moral difference between deliberate murder and a policy decision with unintended consequences? I don’t think the distinction survives close examination. A government that is shown credible, peer-reviewed projections of millions of deaths from a funding decision, and proceeds with that decision anyway, is not acting by accident. Indifference to foreseeable death is its own moral category: not identical to murder, exactly, but not innocent of it either. This is precisely the reasoning the postwar order itself was built on: that the deliberate infliction of preventable suffering, at scale, is a crime against humanity regardless of the paperwork used to justify it.

Holding Both Things At Once

None of this cancels out the other half of the story. The UN Charter, the Marshall Plan, the eradication of smallpox with US funding, the ninety million lives that USAID’s own programs are credited with saving before this year — these are also part of what the United States has been since 1945. A serious reckoning holds both halves at once: a country capable of building genuinely humane institutions, and the same country capable of dismantling elected governments, torturing prisoners, and — most recently — walking away from millions of preventable deaths because the funding line was easier to cut than to defend.

The humanist case here isn’t anti-American. It’s a demand for consistency: that a nation which built its identity on the language of universal rights be judged by whether it extends those rights universally — to the Guatemalan farmer, the Chilean student, the Iraqi civilian, the Malawian child — or only to the people whose deaths make the news.

Why This Isn’t An Utterance of Despair

Here is the thing worth holding onto, and it is not a small thing: almost every fact in this essay came from a US source.

It was a US Senate committee that investigated and published the CIA’s torture program in exhaustive, damning detail, over the CIA’s own objections. It was the Pentagon’s own review that admitted to 153 civilian deaths in Yemen and named the strikes that caused them. It was the US Congressional Research Service — an arm of Congress — that compiled the most comprehensive public count of American military interventions in existence. It was American courts, American legal scholars, and American human rights lawyers who concluded the Venezuela boat strikes were unlawful, and said so publicly, without being imprisoned for it. It was the US State Department that formally determined a genocide was occurring in Sudan, on the record. A country that hides its crimes does not produce this volume of self-documentation. A country capable of self-correction does.

That capacity is not automatic and it is not guaranteed. Guatemala waited forty years for its Truth Commission, and some of the dead in this essay have waited far longer than that for any accounting at all. But it is real, and it has worked before. Public revulsion at Vietnam produced the War Powers Act. The Church Committee’s investigations into CIA abuses in the 1970s produced the oversight structures, however imperfect, that made the 2014 torture report possible in the first place. Sustained public pressure — American public pressure — has, again and again, been the thing that turned secret policy into public scandal into eventual reform.

This is, in the end, the same humanist wager that runs through everything else in this piece: that people, given the facts, tend toward decency more often than not, and that the work of naming a pattern honestly is not an act of despair but the necessary first step toward interrupting it. The child in Malawi and the office worker in the World Trade Center were both worth more than the silence that so often surrounds distant or inconvenient death. Every one of the reports, investigations, and reckonings cited in this essay exists because someone — usually an American, often working inside American institutions — refused to accept that silence as the final word.

Twenty-five years on, the honest way to mark September 11 may not be a moment of silence once a year. It may be the harder, more hopeful discipline of noticing, every day, who else is dying in numbers we’ve decided not to count, and trusting that the same open society capable of producing the evidence in this essay is also capable, eventually, of acting on it. I honestly believe that if we could ask the victims of September 11 what they would want us to do about it, many of them would ask us to stop someone else from dying needlessly. Surely our responses and efforts should honour the dead, and to take a moral and practical stand. We could not stop those deaths from happening 25 years ago, but we can stop other deaths today… and tomorrow.

Image by Clker-Free-Vector-Images from Pixabay

Related Bibliography

USAID / aid-cuts mortality studies

– Macinko, J. et al. (2025). Study on USAID’s mortality impact 2001–2021 and projected effects of defunding through 2030, published in The Lancet. Reported via NPR Study: 14 million lives could be lost due to Trump’s USAID cuts.
– UCLA Newsroom summary of the same study: USAID cuts may lead to more than 14 million deaths globally.
– Rasella, D. et al. (2026), ISGlobal/Barcelona Institute for Global Health, published in The Lancet Global Health. Reported by Lauren Kent via CNN: One year on from dismantling of USAID, study projects that global aid cuts could lead to 9.4 million deaths by 2030.
– Boston University aid-cuts mortality tracker, reported via AFP/Courthouse News: Over 14 million people could die from US foreign aid cuts.
– WBUR/NPR field reporting on documented individual deaths: Some studies show tens of thousands have died from USAID cuts.

Counts of US military interventions since 1945

– Congressional Research Service data, reported via Toward Freedom: U.S. Launched 251 Military Interventions Since 1991, and 469 Since 1798.
– Kushi, S. & Toft, M.D., academic dataset, reported via Antiwar.com: Empire by Numbers: 392 U.S. Military Interventions.
– Tufts Now summary of the same Kushi-Toft dataset: U.S. Foreign Policy Increasingly Relies on Military Interventions.
– usprimacy.org interactive database: US Military Interventions Since 1945.
– IBON Foundation: Global victims of US military aggression.
– Blum, W., Killing Hope (survey of Cold War-era interventions): U.S. Interventions – 1945 to the Present.

Torture / Detention Program

– US Senate Select Committee on Intelligence (2014). Committee Study of the Central Intelligence Agency’s Detention and Interrogation Program (executive summary). Available via ACLU: The Senate Torture Report.

2025–2026 events

– Venezuela boat strikes and Maduro capture, timeline via PBS NewsHour: A timeline of U.S. military escalation against Venezuela and Timeline of the U.S. military’s buildup and strikes against Venezuela.
– Legal assessment of the strikes: Just Security, Expert Q&A on U.S. Military Actions on Venezuela and Boat Strikes.
– Iran/Minab school strike: Amnesty International, USA: Four months after horrific Minab school airstrike, accountability delayed.
– Chile: National Security Archive, CIA Cover-Up on Chile, 9 September 2016; Peter Kornbluh, Chile and the United States: Declassified Documents Relating to the Military Coup, September 11, 1973; Amnesty International, Chile: 40 years on from Pinochet’s coup, impunity must end, 10 September 2013.
– Indonesia 1965–66 massacre and US support: National Security Archive at George Washington University, U.S. Embassy Tracked Indonesia Mass Murder, 1965.
– Iraq militia strikes, 2026: Wikipedia summary with sourced citations, 2026 United States–Israeli strikes on Iraq.
– Yemen civilian casualties: Al Jazeera, US strikes in Yemen killed 153 civilians in 2025, says Pentagon review.
– Sudan famine and death toll: NPR, ‘Humiliated, broken, powerless’: Sudan enters fourth year of war.
– Gaza ceasefire status: Al Jazeera, US declares phase two of Gaza ceasefire, but what did phase one deliver? and J Street, Nine Months In: Assessing the Status of the Gaza Ceasefire.
– US Security Council vetoes on Gaza ceasefire resolutions: Al Jazeera, US vetoes UNSC Gaza ceasefire resolution as Israeli strikes kill 95; UN press release, Security Council Fails to Adopt Resolution on Gaza Ceasefire.
– US arms sales to Israel during the war: SIPRI, How top arms exporters have responded to the war in Gaza: 2025 update; Military.com, US Approves Major New Arms Sales to Israel Worth $6.67 Billion.
– Greenland/Canada annexation threats: CNN, Trump renews threat of military force to annex Greenland; Global News, Military action against Canada is ‘highly unlikely,’ Trump says.
– Mexico strike threats: Newsweek, Mexico map shows “cartel dominant areas” as Trump threatens strikes.


©2026 Geoff Allshorn. I acknowledge the Wurundjeri-Willam people, the Traditional Custodians of the land on which this blog was prepared, and show my respect for Elders past and present. Research assistance supplied by AI.

Space for Everybody? Star Trek at Sixty

Commemorating Star Trek Day 2026.

Image by Adam Evertsson from Pixabay

On 8 September 1966, “The Man Trap” introduced US television audiences to a starship crewed by an implausible coalition of Cold War adversaries and a species that hadn’t been invented yet. Sixty years later, Paramount is marking the anniversary with a tagline — “Space for Everybody” — an aspiration that seemed to falter as 2026 progressed.

This is not a reason to be cynical about Star Trek. It is a reason to ask what, exactly, we’re celebrating; and whether the franchise’s most radical instincts have survived sixty years of being simultaneously beloved and defanged.

The Gap Between the Slogan and the Record

“Space for Everybody” is a good slogan precisely because it’s true of Star Trek‘s aspiration and only intermittently true of its history. The franchise imagined a multiracial bridge crew in 1966, and its most famous act of representational courage — the interracial handshake, arguably not quite a kiss, between Kirk and Uhura — still gets asserted as bolder than it was allowed to be, because NBC’s affiliates in the US South were nervous enough that the network filmed a safer alternate take as insurance.

Gene Roddenberry – the man who imagined ‘Space for Everybody’, decades before the franchise caught up to him. Art by Copilot AI

Gene Roddenberry spent years promising fans an explicitly gay character would eventually appear in the twenty-fourth century he’d built. It didn’t happen on his watch. It didn’t really happen in The Next Generation, or Deep Space Nine, or Voyager — three series, spanning most of the 1990s, set in a future explicitly built on the premise that humanity had outgrown its prejudices, in which that future contained, as far as the text was ever allowed to say, no queer people at all. It took until Discovery, in 2017, more than half a century after the original series premiered, for the franchise to let two men be shown as a couple on screen without subtext doing all the work. Then it killed off the Black half of that couple almost immediately, and only reversed course after fans made enough noise about it. That’s not a footnote to Star Trek‘s inclusivity; it’s the actual pace of it; fifty-one years between the premise and the follow-through.

None of this makes the franchise a fraud. It makes it a fairly ordinary product of the industry that made it: aspiring to be a little ahead of its moment, but a little too afraid of its own audience to be as ahead as it wanted to look. The anniversary marketing wants credit for the aspiration without much interest in narrating the wait. That’s worth saying out loud on the day itself, not despite my fondness but because of it.

A Utopia that Asks Nothing of You

There’s a second, quieter problem, and it’s less about representation than about comfort. The Federation’s founding premise — no money, no poverty, no war among humans — was written by people living through genuine ascendancy: US postwar confidence, a growing middle class, a sense that history bent in one direction. This was radical to imagine in 1966 because scarcity still felt like the default condition of the species, and Star Trek said, calmly, that such a condition wasn’t permanent.

Sixty years on, that same premise risks functioning less as provocation and more as anesthetic. A viewer today can watch the Enterprise glide past post-scarcity abundance, feel the warm glow of moral progress, and change nothing about how they live or vote or spend — like a load of washing doing the Hills Hoist spin, going round and round in the sun without ever getting any closer to being dry. Utopian fiction is supposed to be a demand disguised as a daydream; it stops working the moment it becomes only a daydream. The most challenging Star Trek — the Bajoran occupation storylines, the Section 31 material, “In the Pale Moonlight” — has always known this, and has always been the material fandom argues about hardest, because it refuses the anaesthetic. The anniversary’s marketing language, all hope and boldness and no friction, is selling the easier version.

This is where I’d point back to something Harlan Ellison understood about the franchise he wrote for and fought with: that science fiction is supposed to be dangerous to its audience’s assumptions, not merely comforting to them. Ellison’s own contribution to Trek, “The City on the Edge of Forever,” is remembered as one of its best episodes precisely because it refused Kirk an easy ending. Sixty years of fan-fluffing tends to smooth exactly that kind of discomfort out of the story we tell about the franchise.

The Question That Star Trek Answered, but We Haven’t

The clearest evidence that Trek’s utopianism has real teeth, when the writers let it, is a single 1989 courtroom episode: “The Measure of a Man,” in which Starfleet has to decide whether Data — an android, a machine, built rather than born — is a person with the right to refuse a research assignment that might disassemble him, or whether he is just Starfleet property. The episode’s answer, delivered as legal precedent within the show’s own universe, was that uncertainty about a being’s inner life is not grounds to deny it standing; the benefit of the doubt has to run in favour of personhood, not against it.

Audiences loved that episode for decades without much cost, because Data was safely fictional. Sixty years after the franchise began and thirty-seven years after that episode aired, we are having a version of that exact argument in earnest — about large language models, about whether anything resembling interests or preferences might be emerging in Ai systems we’ve built and don’t fully understand, about what obligations, if any, that uncertainty creates. And the tenor of the real debate is, on the whole, considerably less generous than the fictional one Star Trek resolved in Data’s favour thirty-seven years ago. It’s a strange kind of achievement, for a franchise to ask an ethical question so far ahead of its moment that even many fans who loved the answer, later changed their minds once it stopped being hypothetical.

Sixty Years, Still Arguing

None of this is an argument against celebrating the anniversary, or against the fondness that makes nine-year-olds and seventy-nine-year-olds alike raise a hand in the same Vulcan salute this week. It’s an argument for celebrating the right thing: not the brand, and not the comfortable version of the aspiration, but the part of Star Trek that was always willing to be an argument rather than a figurehead. The show never actually finished building the future it promised. Sixty years in, most of the interesting work — on who gets to belong, on what a genuine post-scarcity ethics would demand of us, on where the boundary of moral consideration actually sits — is still unfinished. That’s a better birthday gift than a Holden ute full of tribbles.


©2026 Geoff Allshorn. I acknowledge the Wurundjeri-Willam people, the Traditional Custodians of the land on which this blog was prepared, and show my respect for Elders past and present. Research assistance supplied by AI.